TRANSCRIPT
DATE:March 2, 2006
TIME: 10:00 AM
LOCATION: H-313 The Capitol


Page: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5

Cont'd from page 3

Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I appreciate here your tolerance and your patience.  I appreciate your tolerance and patience.  I think there is a great deal of worthwhile discussion that has come out of all of this.  The purpose, however, of this meeting, this hearing, was on lobbying reform.  There is a lot of discussion on other issues that I am involved with, but that will be for another time.  I am not going to suggest at all that they are not interrelated, because they are. 
But before I was elected to Congress, I was ‑‑ I had a small business in my hometown.  We sold paper and janitorial supplies.  That happens to be a very big industry in this country, large enough that there are only three sites to hold a national convention. 
I say that because these national conventions that they have ‑‑ I don't know if that is the proper word, really a trade show ‑‑ is designed for all of the entrepreneurs in this industry to show their wares.  I went to several of those.  We had, I thought, very good product lines. 
But the point I am getting to is this, is that I viewed those companies and their salesmen as, in many respects, lobbyists for their wares.  They came to me, and they laid out what they had to sell, how broad their product line was, how unique it was, in order to help people that would buy their product line.  Then I could go to the next booth and talk to a similar manufacturer of similar products, and at the end of the day, I would make up a determination which will be best for my business. 
That is what the essence of salesmanship is, and that is the essence, of, in my view, of what lobbyists is.  Lobbyists, frankly, go a step farther because they are constitutionally protected. 
Now, it is interesting that yesterday, and even today, we are referring to a bill that we are currently debating on the floor right now.  It was suggested yesterday that one of the Members, in fact, the sponsor of the bill, was not qualified to deal with that subject matter because that individual was not a scientist or biophysicist or whatever it was that was described.  I am not sure I ascribe to that theory, but if we were to take that theory and extend it to today, it seems to me here that the one person who is actively involved in lobbying reforms is a lobbyist.  I don't think any of you are a lobbyist ‑‑ I don't think you lobby anymore, at least you didn't suggest that.  Are you a registered lobbyist? 
Mr. Wertheimer.  Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  [Presiding.]  Okay, I apologize for that. 
But with that in mind, with that in mind, I noted here ‑‑ and I apologize, I missed part of your testimony, Mr. Miller.  I was, as a matter of fact, meeting with some constituents.  They were lobbying me on an issue that was very important to my district.  I took to heart what they had to say.  I think that is part of the process. 
But I note here that you have a code of ethics, and let me read through these, at least by article.  I won't read them all.  The first one is article 1, honesty and integrity.  You have a couple of bullet points your industry ought to comply with.  Article 2 is compliance with applicable laws, regulations and rules, self‑governing.  Article 3 talks about professionalism.  Article 4 talks about conflicts of interest; article 5, due diligence and best efforts; article 6, compensation and engagement terms ‑‑ that was alluded to, and I am sure you are sensitive to that one; article 7, confidentiality; article 8, public education; article 9, duty to governmental institutions. 
Those are the articles of your code of ethics, your professional organization.  This was passed, I understand, in 2000, so you are emerging as an association. 
I just want to ask all of you that are not lobbyists ‑‑ so, Mr. Wertheimer, you don't have to respond to this ‑‑ but those of you that are not lobbyists, what do you think of these codes of ethics that the lobbyist organizations put together? 
By the way, Dr. Thurber, there is nothing wrong with the dams in Washington.  The fish are passing very well through that.
Mr. Thurber.  I just don't want them to be breached.     
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Neither do I.  That is why I say everything is working well.
Mr. Thurber.  As you know, I taught at Washington State University for several years.
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  You are a Cougar then.
Mr. Thurber.  Not a Cougar, I just taught there.
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  You know what the word "coogie" means then? 
Mr. Thurber.  No.
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Then I won't tell you.
Mr. Thurber.  I have studied his code of ethics, and I have served on the ethics committee of the American Association of Political Consultants.  For the past 5 years I chaired it.  I am on the executive board of that organization.  It is made up of campaign consultants, but also some lobbyists. 
Respectfully to Paul, the problem with his organization is that maybe ‑‑ and he would have a better estimate ‑‑ that only about 10 percent of the lobbyists in Washington, D.C. ‑‑ and not from the major firms, in my opinion ‑‑ belong to that organization.  But I have studied it.  I have published about that code of ethics, the code of ethics at the AEPC, and I think that it would be a good idea for lobbyists to sign on to this and to join this organization. 
The problem is that they are not really taking it ‑‑ sorry, Paul ‑‑ very seriously, and they are not joining.  They claim, and I agree with them, the ones that I know, and I know many of them, that they are meeting or exceeding those codes of ethics. 
The most important thing about ethical behavior is not only the law, but their internal code that they develop over many years.  If you don't have it, you don't succeed.  If you are like Abramoff ‑‑ and almost every lobbyist that I know that teaches in my classes say that he is really an outlier.  I mean, it is very, very rare to have that kind of phenomena going on.  They say that they have got an internal code of ethics that regulates that.  I have run surveys and also focus groups with interest groups ‑‑ I mean, with lobbyists. 
By the way, I said interest groups, because most of the lobbyists in Washington, D.C., are lobbyists for associations or professional associations.  They are not free‑standing firms that are like law firms that bring in clients. 
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Most of those associations probably have a code of ethics also. 
Mr. Thurber.  They do. 
I am going on and on and on.  I support the code of ethics, but it is not being taken very seriously right now, as I recall. 
Mr. Miller.  Congressman, can I respond to that?  I disagree a little bit.  Our code of ethics for our members is very serious.  Most of the folks I know have it hanging on our wall.  They find it is something that they have to live by and should live by. 
As far as us not having key members in this town or highly respected lobbyists in this town as members of ours, I disagree with you on that.  Bob Walker, one of your former colleagues, is a board member of ours and very active in our organization.  Patton Boggs is very active in our organization; Don Alexander, former IRS Commissioner, still a strong member of ours.  You have Cassidy & Associates, who are members of ours, with former Congressman Jack Quinn sitting on our board of directors. 
Mr. Thurber.  I am sorry.  If I might come back.  I make that statement empirically, because I have studied who is in your organization and who isn't, so I make it from that judgment.  It is not a value judgment, it is an empirical observation.
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Let me make an observation, too.  This organization is only 6 years old, if I read this correctly ‑‑ or the code of ethics is only 6 years old, but the organization has been around 25 years.  I confess, in the industry that I was talking about ‑‑ not everybody that sells paper and janitorial supplies is in the janitorial industry, but they see value in that.  I think the more we talk about that, hopefully, the more they will see value in what you have to offer.  I think that is a very positive thing. 
This is the people's government.  We are free to make whatever associations that we want to make.  In fact, I think that is why we have done so well as broadly as we are in this country, from different backgrounds and so forth, why we are where we are today in the world, because of that free association.  I think we shouldn't lose sight of that. 
Dr. Wertheimer, did you want to say something? 
Mr. Miller.  Could I add one quick thing about that?  I realize that this issue with Mr. Abramoff is a real serious one for our profession, but prior to this our organization realized that we needed to do more.  We needed to do more in the area of education.  So it happens to be circumstance, but we have implemented a new, voluntary lobbying certification program for our members to help better educate them on the new rules and everything else that is going on here, so that they can continue to get education.  There is really not one place that you can go in a couple hours at a time to get some real education on this.  We are doing that now.  It is helping with our membership.  I make no bones about that. 
So our organization has always been labeled as a breakfast luncheon club.  It was in the beginning.  It is becoming and growing into a lot more.  We have been around 25 years, but I would say in the last 6 years we have become real serious.  We are in the infancy stages. 
Mr. Wertheimer.  I do want to add something here.
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Please. 
Mr. Wertheimer.  Mr. Abramoff has been described as an aberration, and certainly in terms of his criminality and his personal ethics code and his greed and his use of language, he is an aberration.  But the techniques that Mr. Abramoff used are used by many lobbyists.  The providing of trips, the providing of campaign contributions, in his case both hard money and soft money, before soft money was banned, the providing of meals, the providing of tickets to sporting events, the kinds of techniques he used to try to gain influence are common practice in Washington among lobbyists. 
I think it is a mistake to simply focus on Mr. Abramoff as an aberration.  I think you have to focus on the practices that are used to try to influence Members of Congress and how to change the rules here to protect both the interests of the American people and your own reputations and your own integrity. 
Mr. Ornstein.  Just one quick comment, Mr. Hastings.  Codes of ethics are nice.  This is a perfectly good code of ethics.  I had a small hand in the drafting of the House and Senate codes of ethics back in the mid‑1970s. It was a difficult job, and they are well done as well. 
Any code of ethics is only as good as the enforcement that is behind it.  It is nice to educate people on what is appropriate, and maybe what is inappropriate.  Clever people can take a code of ethics and do things that are fit to do within it that are simply inappropriate.  But if people know there will be nobody looking over their shoulders and that they can do all kinds of things without it being disclosed ‑‑ and that if it is disclosed nothing in particular is going to happen to them ‑‑ and if in the process they can make lots of money, then it becomes meaningless.  I think that is as true among lobbyists as it is here.
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  I think our Founders recognized that.  That is why they made three branches of government with three distinct responsibilities.  After all, we are all human.  We are subject to human frailties.  That is the very basis of what our country is founded upon is self‑discipline of some sort.  That is very difficult.  There is no question about that.
Finally, I want to ask a question of you, Dr. Ornstein and Mr. Wertheimer.  I think both of you are on record as saying specifically for staff there ought to be a 2‑year cooling period.  Two questions in that regard.  Are you afraid that there may be a ‑‑ before a 2‑year time period is put in place, there may be a brain drain off the Hill, because there are some very, very good staffers here.  You know, with the different makeup of our society, people ‑‑ I mean, when I grew up, people tended to stay in one job all the time.  That certainly has changed.  I mean, different generations do all of that. 
First question, are you afraid of a brain drain; and the second one is an obvious follow‑up to that.  If the first one is that they are concerned about that, would there not be a concern about people ‑‑ many could go on the Hill, knowing that you will have that 2‑year exception? 
Mr. Wertheimer.  Well, our principal focus has been in increasing the 2‑year period for former Members of Congress, and to broadening the scope so that members could neither ‑‑ 
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  This question was specifically staffed. 
Mr. Wertheimer.  That is what I am saying, that is our principal focus.  We have supported increasing the current scope from 1 year to 2 years.  We have not supported making it apply to the whole body as some proposals have done.  We have supported an increase to 2 years, going back to your own office, or to your own committee. 
I think the concern you raise is a legitimate one.  I think you do need to have a balance here that makes it capable for people to come on and off the Hill, while at the same time providing protections.  I think the issues are different for staff than they are for Members.  I think the biggest potential problem today lies with former Members as opposed to congressional staff. 
Mr. Ornstein.  I am going to disagree a little bit there.  I worry about the staff.  I worry about it in a variety of ways.  I have been worried about a brain drain for a long time, even without a 2‑year ban.  In fact, I think the way things have worked, the incentive for staff to leave and go into lobbying jobs has increased enormously for several years. 
We have lost an awful lot of good people, but it also has a pernicious element to it.  My guess is, based on the news stories we have seen and the investigation ongoing, that Tony Rudy, who is now currently under investigation, who appears, from news stories, to have really operated as a mole for Mr. Abramoff, inside the Majority Leader's office, part of it was an understanding that he would then go out and be able to make a bundle as a lobbyist. 
The temptations for these kinds of dealings for staff, for senior staff, are just as serious as they are for Members.  If I had my druthers, I would sharply increase the pay of congressional staff.  I think, given the responsibilities that they have, the pay for many of them is way too low.  At least I can get some support around the table.
Mr. Thurber.  A lot of smiles. 
Mr. Ornstein.  But I have seen all kinds of people leave $50,000 jobs on Capitol Hill for $180,000 up on K Street.  That is true from both sides of the aisle.  It is not a very good process.  Having a little bit more of a ‑‑ it has happened ‑‑ you know, the number of former Members who are now up lobbying has increased dramatically in the last 10 years.  The number of former staffers who move right into lobbying has increased tremendously. 
The sense that this is a career for people has gone down, at the same time, tremendously.  I don't know if we can get that back.  But a 2‑year cooling‑off period ‑‑ maybe you create a threshold for more senior staff would be a good thing.  Would we lose a lot of people in the meantime?  Yes.  It would cause a bump in the road.  I think you will find lots of very bright young people out there who would be willing to come in, and maybe senior people in Congress who care about the institution should think about ways of creating a different climate around here so that people want to stay for longer periods of time, and we can restore some of that sense of professionalism that we had when I came here. 
Mr. Thurber.  Mr. Hastings. 
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Yes.  Go ahead. 
Mr. Thurber.  After 32 years of teaching and seeing literally hundreds, thousands of students come through American University and come to the Hill, they come here for a variety of reasons, but much of it is to be involved in making good public policy, loyalty to a Member, to be a public servant, but they are not paid enough.  They would love to stay, but they have to leave because they begin to have families and children.  You cannot live on the salaries that they have up here. 
At least the Hill should consider having a compensation system similar to the GS system in the executive branch, but it is hard for you to vote for increases in your own ‑‑ you know, your own budgets for your own offices. 
The loss of expertise on the Hill is a serious problem.  I agree with Norm, and expanding this from 1 year to 2 years just isn't going to make that much difference compared to what is going on right now.  That is that the really good people have to leave because they can't live on the incomes that they have up here, in my opinion.
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  I appreciate the give and take on that.  I just want to make two other observations.  It was suggested, I think, just about by all of you in your opening remarks that we have a real opportunity to act now on some meaningful reforms.  I would just make this observation, and that is that Congress and elected bodies tend to always react. 
If it is a people's government, we are always behind the people, where we are.  I think we will do that.  I think we can do it in a bipartisan basis.  I mean, the case in point is your firm is reacting now to one individual's bad conduct. 
Secondly, it was alluded to, I think, not by only Dr. 
Ornstein, that the size of the government may have an impact on public policy.  Let me give you a case in point, because Dr. Thurber brought it up.  He talked about the dams on the lower Snake River, and they ought not to be breached.  That becomes a national policy when it shouldn't.  Because of that, a number of people that are affected by that potential policy all of a sudden got involved in government, which they probably wouldn't have, because there is no reason for them to get involved in the policy of the government.  But when something potentially, from their point of view, adversely affects them, then they have that constitutional right, and one of the best ways to do that, of course, is to hire somebody to represent their views.  So I think there is a direct coalition ‑‑ coordination, I can't think of the word off the top of my head. 
Mr. Ornstein.  Correlation. 
Mr. Hastings of Washington.  Correlation.  Thank you.  I knew it started with a C ‑‑ correlation between the size of the government and the amount of lobbying activity that goes on, for good and bad reasons.  But since this was brought up ‑‑ it is not in my district, it is in my area.  I think it is a very good point to represent the point.  Thank you very much for your testimony. 
Mr. McGovern. 
Mr. McGovern.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
First let me thank everybody for your patience and for being here so long.  I will try to be brief. 
First of all, I agree with what everybody has said here on the need for transparency and increased transparency and increase the accountability.  But the fact of the matter is that we can pass all the new rules and regulations we want, but they are meaningless unless we enforce them. 
So on two levels, you need strong enforcement, members of the committee themselves, but you also need the political will existing in the institution to actually follow through and make them enforceable. 
Let me just say on the side on the travel issue, I feel wrestled back and forth on whether we should ban all travel or try to make exceptions.  Let me give you one example in travel where I thought it was beneficial to me that wasn't funded by the government.  That is some foreign travel. 
When you go on a publicly funded trip sponsored by the government, especially if you go to a hot spot, they control pretty much where you go.  They dictate to you oftentimes places you can't go to.  Especially in a country that ‑‑ you know, where your position may be different from the government's position, you go down there, and all of a sudden, you are limited to who you can talk to and where you can go and places you can see.  It presents kind of an interesting dilemma. 
However, if there is no way to make exceptions for that, I think banning for all travel makes sense.  But I think it is wrong, and I think you all agree that all travel is not necessarily bad.  There is value with that.  I am probably more with Professor Thurber on that issue. 
I would respectfully but strongly disagree with Mr. Miller that campaign reform and finance reform and lobbying reform are separate issues.  I think they are very much related.  After all, Jack Abramoff's primary weapon of choice is a free lunch, it was a fat PAC check.  The bottom line is what I have ‑‑ in my 10 years here, I have been in the Minority all 10 years here, but in my 10 years here as a Member of Congress, the emphasis on money ‑‑ and I will say, you know, by both parties ‑‑ is ridiculous.  In order to get reelected, you need to raise $1 million or $2 million depending on where you live.  The pressure by political parties, you know, if you don't have an opponent, to go out there and raise more money for other people ‑‑ the pressure constantly that you need to raise money, that is part of your responsibility.  I think that is probably on both sides. 
I think, as a result, you end up creating a climate where you have people who kind of stray off course.  We have seen some of those people go and try to ‑‑ you are offering money, I will go out and I will try to do business with you.  I think that is a corrupting influence here.  The money has been a corrupting influence here.  I think anybody who says that it hasn't been is living in another world.  I think whoever says the major pieces of legislation that have been enacted into law have not been influenced by money, you know, are not living in the real world. 
I mean, we were talking earlier about this bill that is coming to the floor early next week on reducing the standards for food labeling and health security.  The complaint that many of us had was not that ‑‑ that this legislation was going to be discussed; the fact is that our complaint was that there were no hearings. 
When Ms. Slaughter asked the question of the Chairman, who was here, whether you were a scientist, it wasn't that you have to be a scientist to decide whether you have to vote yes or no on the bill.  The question was we have tons of letters from scientists, commissioners, and heads of our departments of agriculture from all over the country, from every State you can imagine, objecting to this, saying this is very dangerous what you are doing.  Why are we rushing something like that to the floor without going through due process, without deliberating?  I mean, it is inconceivable to me that we are doing that, other than the fact that there is a very well‑financed special interest that is pushing this. 
I would like to ‑‑
Mr. Miller.  May I explain my comment, campaign financing, lobbying reform are being kept separate? 
Mr. McGovern.  When I finish. 
Mr. Miller.  Okay. 
DCMN NORMAN
Mr. McGovern.  To be honest with you, I agree with Mr. Bacchus.  If I had my way, we would have a public financing of elections.  I would like to take the money right out of the system.  I think it would clean this place up overnight.  Doesn't end all of the problems, but it would take a lot of the problems right off the table. 
The other thing is, I want to commend a number of you who have acknowledged and recognized that we have some serious institutional problems here in this Congress, not just with lobbying.  I think it is convenient right now to say this is all about lobbying.  The title of this hearing is all about lobbying. 
But the fact of the matter is, we have a huge problem with this legislative process.  Now, I acknowledge I am in the minority, so I guess I am expected to grouse about the way the system is here.  But I have to tell you, I don't know how anybody can defend what is going on here.  I have tried to get answers on the rationale why we should bring a bill to the floor without Members having the opportunity to read it.  What is the value in that?  Can somebody rationalize why that has to happen, or, you know, why we have to close off the amendment process so strictly over ‑‑ why can't we deliberate on the floor? 
When I was a staff member here, the defense bill used to take a week, sometimes 2 weeks.  Now we do it in a couple of hours.  Sometimes even shorter than that, you know, depending on how the process is restricted. 
The fact of the matter is that we have ceased to be a deliberative body, and I guess ‑‑ again, I am trying not to sound partisan here, but if you are the party in power, maybe the incentive is you could control things more if you don't have a deliberative process.  You know, if you don't allow for amendments, you could control the outcome.  If you don't allow people to read the bill, they won't find out about some of the more controversial things until 2 weeks later.  Sometimes there is a tendency, when a particular party has too much power, to see some arrogance appear, you know, that we can do whatever we want because we can.  I regret the fact I think that is what is happening here. 
I know a lot of my Republican friends feel the same way.  There are a lot of Republicans who have good amendments that come before this committee that routinely get denied.  So it is not just Democrats getting shut out. 
I think the way to correct this stuff ‑‑ and this is kind of the challenge of what everybody has said here today ‑‑ is that you have come up with a lot of good ideas, and I think every one of them is legitimate.  But I think for us here as a committee and as a Congress, the first thing we need to do is admit we have a problem. 
There is a tendency to try to say, well, it is a few bad apples, you know, we really don't have a problem; or, no, how could you say that money or special interests are influencing this process?  That is not happening.  The fact of the matter is, I mean, anybody with their eyes open knows we have a problem here.  The question is whether we have the political will to actually do what we can do to clean this place up. 
Let me just ask one question.  At the beginning of the hearing, I made a reference to the fact that all the issues that we are talking about all of a sudden just didn't come to light today.  Some of these issues go back to previous Congresses, previous parties in control, but I mentioned the K Street Project and the fact that I did a search, and we have articles that go back to December of 1996. 
This is an article from the Washington Times, says Republican leaders next month will issue a face‑to‑face warning to corporate leaders.  K Street lobbying firms will be told in no uncertain terms that if they want access to Republican legislative leaders, they had better send GOP lobbyists rather than Democrats left over from 40 years of control on the Hill. 
Here is another one from the Washington Post. 
"From the Hill:  Facing mounting pressure from Republican lawmakers, with lingering Democratic dominance on K Street, lobbying firms are anxiously courting top GOP Members and their aides.  One House GOP Member put it bluntly.  Our message is this:  Don't hire Democratic lobbyists because we won't meet with them.  If you want to lobby Republican offices, send a Republican lobbyist, because we are in control."  It goes on; I have all of these different articles. 
I guess what I am concerned about is the fact that, you know, what we are trying to do up here, whether the Republicans are in control or the Democrats are in control, is, you know, is deliberate; to do the people's business, and to have ‑‑ all people have access to Members of Congress.  I am not bashing lobbyists here, there are Democratic lobbyists and Republican lobbyists.  But the bottom line, that message is coming out of here, if the culture on the Hill is you only send me one kind of lobbyist. 
It gets to what Ms. Slaughter was pointing to before.  You tend to get one side:  What do you think of the K Street Project; what other lobbyists think of a K Street Project.  How do you deal with this?  I do think this is a corruption of the system. 
I am curious to get your feedback on how we should respond to that. 
Professor Thurber. 
Mr. Thurber.  Yes.  Over the last 20 years, I just calculated, I have had over 1,200 presentations by lobbyists here in Washington.  So I know them very well.  They talked about the K Street Project that started several years ago and it evolved.  Democrats and Republicans alike don't like it.  Democrats especially didn't like it, Democratic people lobbying.
 But when you leave here, there is an epiphany that occurs to a certain extent.  If you watch Senator Mitchell and Senator Dole, after they left, they are very good friends.  Representative Gingrich now is pushing for reform.  The thing that occurs when you leave ‑‑ and it is not as partisan as one would think in those terms, they don't want it to be partisan, but indeed the K Street project was affected for a while.  The Senate has acted on this, as you know, yesterday.  But I think it is lobbying light in terms of what they did. 
Democrats and Republicans alike have the right, and they will recommend staff members and also Members of Congress to firms when they leave.  But to organize that, and to have only one party be the primary party that is considered with a clearance system, was quite unique, actually.  I had not seen that before it started, really, under Newt Gingrich; and then it evolved.  I think there is pushback on it right now. 
I think there is embarrassment about it.  I think it is likely to affect the way the firms hire and the associations hire.  Although there are some classic cases of Democrats that were up for the heads of associations, they didn't get that because of pressure from the leadership here in the House of Representatives.  I don't think that will happen under this new leadership, in my opinion. 
Mr. Miller.  May I answer one quick question? 
Mr. McGovern.  Sure.
Mr. Miller.  I want to go back to lobbying reform and campaign issue, keeping them separate.  I truly believe if you match those two, at the end of the day you will not get anything that will be good for the American people and it is not going to be good for you, and it is not going to be good for us.  I think you have to look at this as two separate issues.  You are free to deal with both of them. 
I just think if you are looking at something that is going to be effective, I truly think you have to look at them separately and deal with them separately; that if you do them together, that I don't think you are going to be able to get a compromise on Republicans or Democrats to make something happen that will be effective. 
Mr. Ornstein.  Comments on a couple of things that you mentioned.  First, I am distressed by the collapse of a deliberative process in a whole lot of places.  This will be a Congress with the smallest number of days in session that we have had since 1947. 
When I came here, we had a Tuesday‑Thursday club.  It tended to be really limited to the Members from the Northeast and the region right around here.  They would come back Monday night.  Usually, we would have sessions Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday.  They would leave at the end of the day, Thursday. 
The Tuesday‑to‑Thursday club now is universal, or close to it.  It involves coming back very late Tuesday, because there aren't votes before 6:30, and leaving Thursday around noon or soon thereafter if you can possibly get out of here.  This is not a good way to run an institution. 
The number of hearings ‑‑ if you look at the number of hearings by Congress going back to the 1960s, 1970s, all the way forward, there has been a decline in the number per Congress.  But now it has dropped very, very significantly. 
If you told me, after this hearing you can write the lobbying reform bill to your full satisfaction, and that is what we are going to enact, I would be distressed, quite frankly, because whatever I would write or put together should be scrubbed and vetted and go through a very serious hearing process and get give‑and‑take, and then go to the floor and then have a significant process there.  Too many bills don't have that happen now. 
I don't care whether it is a lobbyist for a corporate interest or a lobbyist for the public interest, or somebody else, or a member or a staff putting a bill together.  The essence of deliberation is time, give‑and‑take and back‑and‑forth, that we have just lost a lot of it.  It is not brand new but it is accelerated. 
On the K Street Project, Mr. Cole mentioned early on, on his graph, the book by Brooks Jackson.  We would be naive and wrong to suggest that under 40 years of Democratic rule, we had an open process on K Street.  K Street, the lobbying element, the public relations element, the law firm element was dominated by Democrats.  It didn't happen through some organized process.  It happened over a period of time.  It also happened that as we moved into the 1900s and 1990s, you had Democrats in positions of power, saying I want more from the business community.  We got the reins power here, and we want them to contribute. 
The K Street Project, as it started out, I think, was a perfectly reasonable idea ‑‑ we are in power, we ought to have some of our people in some of these positions as well ‑‑ that morphed quickly into something that we had not seen before.  And that has been, I think, absolutely distressing, because it has been an attempt by at least some to create a self‑reinforcing loop, where we don't just ask or try to get some of our people into positions; we want specific people in specific positions, and they will then respond by giving campaign contributions back to the party, to individuals, so that we can be sure that we stay in power to keep this moving.  And it also involved, very distressingly, the use of the power of the State to coerce positions that included the Electronics Industries Association, where we had two treaties of the United States held up that were favored by the association, out of displeasure, because they picked Dave McCurdy over somebody else. 
It gets to allegations surrounding the Investment Company Institute and its lobbyists in an attempt to fire a lobbyist and replace her with somebody else, with at least some in the industry saying that they were told that hearings, followed by legislation involving the industry, would go very badly if these actions weren't taken. 
That is over and above anything I have seen in my time here.  It crosses lines.  And the legislative actions taken by the Senate Rules Committee yesterday ‑‑ and, apparently, I am now told, by the Governmental Affairs Committee in the House today ‑‑ are poor excuses for dealing with some of these excesses. 
Mr. McGovern.  I thank you again for your testimony.  Again, I will just conclude by saying that I think so much of all the important things that you have been saying and so much of the things that we have been saying up here really depends on whether you have the political will to move forward, and I hope we do. 
I will tell you that I don't think there is a single Member here, who, when they go back to their district, don't get the same refrain from their constituents:  What the hell are you doing?  What is wrong with the system?  They are losing confidence in the system.  They also think that their concerns don't matter.  I think that is not what this government is all about, and we need to fix some things.  I hope this is the beginning of a process that will do that.  Thank you. 
Mr. Cole.  [Presiding.]  When I came up here, you said congratulations, Mr. Chairman.  I said it could have been worse, it could have been the Ethics Committee, so this is not a bad thing.  I want to start, if I may.  Then I will call on my colleagues.  But I want to follow up on a number of points and offer some observations. 
First, I want to begin by thanking all of you.  You have been here for an enormously long time and you have been incredibly generous with your thoughts and observations.  Frankly, I wish I could take you all to dinner, dutch treat, of course ‑‑ that is for the record ‑‑ and continue this. 
Mr. Ornstein.  You can. 
Mr. Cole.  I would be delighted to do that, Norm, sometime.  I have been a long time in this business.  I have been a State senator, I have been a Secretary of State.  I have been a Congressman, I was ED of the NRCC, I was chief of staff of the RCC.  I have a political consulting firm I used to run.  So I think I have seen it as a practitioner. 
I haven't been a lobbyist, but I certainly worked with enough of them, and my old firm had lobbyists in it.  I think I know most ends of this business pretty well.  I would also begin by pointing out, this is not very easy.  Just listening to you guys, you don't agree on private travel, whether we should have it or not.  You don't agree on staff limitations.  So the idea there are relatively five or six easy things to do here, you know, and actually get at the problem, I think, would be a mistake. 
As a matter of fact, I am reminded of the old Lyndon Johnson observation:  Doing the right thing isn't hard; knowing the right thing to do is. 
In the course of your testimony, I counted them before I came up here, well over 20 pages of notes.  When I take notes, I usually have little observations which none of you will ever see.  Some of them are brilliant points; excellent idea, why didn't I think of that?  Some of them are, what was he thinking, has he ever done this before?  He is crazy, that will never work. 
Then there are even some tougher ones than that.  Because you can have this kind of disagreement on these issues, in terms of how you arrive at a process that works. 
It seems to me there are four big areas.  I will have a series of questions and I would invite any of you ‑‑ and I may address to some of you in particular, to talk about. 
But before I do, a couple of other observations: 
One, I was going to make this point.  Actually, Norm, you beat me to it, and then Representative Hastings picked up on it.  I couldn't agree more with size:  that it matters. 
The size of the government has a lot to do with the complexities and the problems that we are facing.  Dr. Thurber used the example $4 million worth of lobbying firepower per Member. 
Well, if you quantified it that way, every Member spends $5.8 billion, if you look at the Federal budget.  So this idea that this is an enormously expensive process, all out of proportion to the size of the Federal budget, just isn't true, whether it is in political campaigns or anything else. 
The other thing I think of when I think of size and complexity is one of the favorite sayings from one of my State's patron saints, Will Rogers, who certainly had no great love, but had a lot of great fun poking fun at this place.  He used to say we are all ignorant about different things. 
When you are in the Congress or legislative body, you find out how many things in a hurry.  I will promise you, nobody up here at this table knows as much as they would like about most issues that they are called upon to vote on.  Nor do they have sufficient staff or sufficient time to do that.  That is an important lobbying function, information function, informative function. 
The idea that only my constituents will know about it, you know ‑‑ I always think, I represent 700,000 people.  I know there is someone amongst that group that knows more than I do about whatever the subject that I am discussing is.  I really do spend a lot of time trying to find out who those people are and sit down and talk to them.  I think, actually, most Members do.  But in the breach and in a hurry, sometimes I can't reach that person.  There will be people there to make a case and an observation.  So the function is a necessary one. 
When we talked about reform ‑‑ and I think that is always a wonderful term, we are always for it.  I will guarantee you there are unintended consequences, having lived through several iterations of campaign finance reform as a political consultant and watched what people told me was going to happen and then watched what happened.  It has been different every time. 
I have never seen an author of a reform piece of legislation that accurately predicted the outcome of it.  Sometimes the consequences were better than anticipated, but frankly, usually, they were worse or they spun something out of control. 
I just will give you my favorite example, 527.  We hear a lot about bipartisanship.  I will promise you, we will have people that voted for campaign finance reform that will not vote to eliminate 527s. They just simply won't, because ‑‑ I didn't think of that, but it is working to the advantage of my side. 
I don't say that judgmentally.  By the way, it happens on both sides, but that is just simply true.  So bipartisanship is good, but it will be enormously tough in this area.  Some of you, I know, believe in public finance.  I could not be more opposed to that idea.  It makes Members, frankly, unresponsive and irresponsible.  Part of the idea of being a good Member, frankly, is earning and soliciting support of all kinds, whether there is somebody that knocks on the door, whether it is an endorsement. 
Most people are not lobbied about things they have already committed themselves on in any meaningful way.  Most campaign decisions and contribution decisions when they are made are usually made because you already know what the person believes in.  They have got a record.  They have voted.  They have made statements.  You are trying to help somebody that has an opinion similar to yours almost every time. 
The amount of them that you are trying to persuade is relatively few.  The danger areas, I will tell you, are always in these areas ‑‑ when you think about Jack Abramoff, he made his money on what I would call the fringes of politics.  Most of the issues he was concerned about were not the issues that, frankly, my constituents would consider of great significance.  It is not the Medicare bill, it is not the defense budget, it is not the war in Iraq, it is not the future of Social Security. 
It was around the edges, where frankly a lot of Members don't know very much.  A lot of staff don't know very much.  I am the only Native American in Congress.  Believe me, I know a lot more about tribal issues than most of the people in here do, and I do talk to more Indians in a week than most of the people in Congress do in a year.  I am very proud to say my tribe never employed Jack Abramoff, never would have.  So there are a lot of complexities here. 
When I look at this, I see four major areas.  If, in a perfect world, I would like to see four different pieces of legislation.  The first one is campaign finance reform.  Again, I would have very different ideas about it than a lot of people up here or even out there, but they are really rooted out of having fought campaigns all over the country in a variety of different levels, and 527 is actually one where people that I might disagree on one thing would probably agree with me on that. 
The second area is legislative process reform, which you all talked about a great deal.  I find a great deal of merit in what was said about looking at the process.  We reformed a lot of the process in the middle 1990s in a burst of this stuff ‑‑ and a lot of that stuff is good.  No proxy meeting is good.  No open committee meetings are good.  No markups are good.  Those were all reform.  Those were good things.  It is time for the next great wave ‑‑ and some of those reforms need to be attitudinal, but some of them ‑‑ clearly to earmarking. 
I am not one of these people that will tell you earmarks are bad.  I will always say Phase II radar for the University of Oklahoma Weather Center is a good thing and a bypass that saves lives is a good thing.  Housing for soldiers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma is a good thing.  I can defend the ones I have been for.  I would be happy to make them public and would love to eliminate last‑minute insertions in conference committee reports.  But that is the second area. 
The third area is lobbying reform, which I want to focus on in a minute, which is very different than process in finance, but it is obviously interrelated.  The final one is ethics. 
In an ideal world, what you would want to do is pass each one of them separately.  Some of you have even taken that point and said, you know, it is a danger to combine them. 
I actually agree with that.  I will also tell you that is sometimes the only way you can get things done around here.  That is the only way, you know, that ‑‑ the only way I can dictate this outcome.  And, by the way, I want it in a perfect process strikes me as a very naive situation. 
It is one of these things that is great in the best of all possible worlds.  If I can only deal with 527s by linking them to something else, I will at least consider that possibility.  I think any legislator would.  It doesn't mean it is the ideal solution, but it is one worth thinking about. 
So you have gotten all my lectures.  Again, I would be happy, because I love the history of this stuff. 
But let me focus on two or three things and ask some questions.  Let me start with lobbying reform. 
I raised the question when I was talking with our Clerk, Madam clerk, Karen, about the idea of auditing lobbyist reports.  It is one of the things that discourages me the most.  I actually think you can fill out a lot of paper.  That is a lot different from somebody looking at it.  The FEC has an auditing function.  I don't think they do it very well.  Frankly, I think they have a lot of people down there that don't know much about campaigns and are an incredible, incredible pain to deal with in terms of paperwork. 
On the other hand, I would tell you that I think the process is cleaner than it was before 1974, so I am not for getting rid of the Federal Elections Commission.  Having said that, how would you audit and who would you audit lobbying reports? 
Yes. 
Mr. Thurber.  If I might expand the scope of this quickly and then get back to your answer, I would first start by just simply enforcing the law right now.  There was one estimate in the Senate hearing that I appeared in 3 weeks ago that there were 2,200 reports from the Senate that have never been acted on by the Department of Justice today.  We have heard 534.  You can audit but there has to be a consequence for the audit.
Mr. Cole.  Is there a DOJ decision ‑‑
Mr. Thurber.  DOJ makes the decision to pursue it, as I understand. 
Mr. Cole.  Why do you think they would be slow to act on that?  This is literally a direct question.  Do you think it is because of a staffing or resource issue; do you think these are politically sensitive, and I don't know that I want to go there; or, you know, I think these are minor technical violations that ought to be looked at as opposed to a Duke Cunningham‑type kind of violation? 
Mr. Thurber.  I don't know authoritatively, but I would probably think they are minor.  But they would probably have resource problems over there, significant resource problems.  But they haven't investigated those who haven't registered, which is a whole other area.  Auditing who?  I mean, if you don't register, there is nothing to audit.  First, you have got to get people to register and have complete information.
.  How would you do it?  I think you would have to do it with many more resources; and, therefore, I like the idea of the Office of Public Integrity with resources that could pursue this. 
Mr. Cole.  Any others care to respond? 
Mr. Wertheimer.  I would just say an audit of these kinds of reports right now will not get you very much.  All you do is do one good‑faith estimate of the total amount you spent for 6 months, and you list the issues you work on and whether you lobby the House or Senate.  So you don't have the kind of information ‑‑
Mr. Cole.  Let us assume for a minute that I agree with you.  I think these things need to be much more revealing and much more inclusive than they are, although again it is always easier for people dreaming up paperwork for other people to do to come up with just a laundry list and cost you a lot of time and money.  Let us just caveat or grant that you are right, we need a much more extensive process. 
Mr. Wertheimer.  You can use random audits, which are often a way ‑‑ they do an effective job of increasing voluntary compliance.
Mr. Cole.  Where would you lodge that?  DOJ function,
or ‑‑
Mr. Wertheimer.  I think lodge it in the Office of Public Integrity, a centralized office in Congress.
Mr. Thurber.  Might I add a bit more?  I have talked to a lot of lobbyists before developing this testimony, for the Senate and for here.  The large firms see no problem.  Even with monthly reports, I have monthly reports advocated in mine.  They are doing it now.  They do think it would be a problem for the small firms, individual, one individual, that has a part‑time intern from American University that is trying to fill these things out.  When you go forward, you have to think about the consequences for a small firm as well as large firms and associations. 
Most of them have functions within their organizations that follow this very carefully.  Law firms follow every 10 minutes in terms of what somebody is doing, and they have a software system to do that.  I would like to advocate or have people think about developing a software system that then could be given to people in the firm, so they could use it not only for registering what they are doing, but also give it to the staff people to keep track of what is going on.  It is difficult. 
Mr. Cole.  Usually the for‑profit firms, frankly, have a resource advantage as to any kind of ideological firm, special cause group, that may have lobbyists.  It is much tougher for those people to have the resources.  These people are keeping those kinds of records because they are billing and expenses records, not because they are compliance records right now.  So you will put an enormous expense on people that are, quote, lobbyists, particularly if we use a broad definition.
Mr. Thurber.  That is a small price for advocacy and democracy, in my opinion.  The AARP, NRA, they all ‑‑ I know, because I know these people, I take my students there ‑‑ they do research.  They all have systems to keep track of this now. 
Mr. Ornstein.  Mr. Cole, I have to leave to catch a plane in a minute. 
Mr. Cole.  Please.
Mr. Ornstein.  Let me just say most of us have testified in Congress many, many times.  The usual pattern is there are a couple of members of a committee there at the beginning.  If you break for a vote, one comes back.  You had nine people here through most of the afternoon and for a very long hearing.  It says something, I must say, about the diligence of the Rules Committee.  So we are impressed with that. 

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